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Preliminary Reflections
Music remains a puzzle to the philosopher. This is the case
despite countless philosophical investigations and discussions.
The presence of the puzzle appears unsatisfactory. Naturally,
the puzzle calls for a solution. The philosopher remains
doubtful about providing a solution to the puzzle. He fears
that a solution will only move the puzzle out of view and hide
it. The continued presence of the puzzle is vital to him
provided the puzzle remains a genuine puzzle because the
puzzle may say more about music than any of its solutions.
The genuine puzzle does not just exist. It is brought to
light by the proper questions. The puzzle appears in the
questions of the philosopher; the philosopher appears in the
puzzle. To lose sight of the puzzle of music is to lose sight of
the philosopher.
Music is made and heard. The musician, the person
hearing and making music, hears and knows the difference
between mere noise and music. Music does not just exist. The
hearing and making of music leads to its appearance; in turn
the musician appears through music. However, what is music?
The musician need not concern himself with this question; he
makes and hears and in this making and hearing remains
within immediate understanding. Music becomes a question
to the observer of the musician and music. How can music be
observed? If it is observed as music the observer will need to
know what he is looking for. The way in which music is
observed may decide if it is questioned. To observe music,
and to ask what music is, may not lead to questions about
music. Why not? Music may have already disappeared from
view where the hearing and making are no longer present.
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The question of the musical work
In his recent book The Aesthetics of Music, Roger Scruton
presents a wide-ranging investigation of music. I Reflection
about its complex details would require a secure ground from
which we could confidently assess the validity of Scruton's
claims and theories about music. However, it does not seem
that such a ground can necessarily be presupposed. It appears
rather that it is the responsibility of philosophical questioning
to expose this ground in the first place, not to assume it.
Accordingly, the following reflections are, in some sense, not
an engagement with Scruton's theories. They are rather an
attempt to question the groundedness of his approach. Much
of the detail of Scruton's exposition will remain unreflected.
It is, in any case, irrelevant to the question of the
philosophical groundedness of his approach. Questioning the
approach and its foundation may appear evasive. The
integrity of philosophical questioning, however, the desire to
understand, inevitably directs our attention away from what a
thinker says to how and why he says it.
This initial indication of a lack of confidence in the
foundations of the subject matter contrasts with Scruton's
own approach. The author is confident, boasting an
impressive level of musical expertise and knowledge. He
claims to philosophise about music. How do we think and
write philosophically about music? How are we to approach
such a complex topic philosophically? Scruton has little
sympathy for such procrastinating questions. Instead, he
argues that music is best approached by looking at the
'central instances of the art':
So, how do we begin to define our theme? Such questions have
bedevilled aesthetics in our times - and unnecessarily so. For
they are empty questions, which present no real challenge to the
philosopher who has a full conception of his subject. Whatever
it is, music is not a natural kind. What is to count as music
depends upon our decision and it is a decision made with a
purpose in mind. That purpose is to describe, and if possible to
extend, the kind of interest that we have in a Beethoven
symphony. Other things satisfy that interest; and there is no
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way of saying in advance which things these will be - not until
we have a clear idea of what exactly interests us in the
Beethoven. The question whether this or that modernist or
postmodernist experiment is a work of music is empty. until
we have furnished ourselves with an account of our central
instances of the art. Only then do we know what the question
means. And even then we may feel no great need to answer it.
(pp.16-7)
The philosopher may indeed have a 'full conception' of the
subject matter. However, as a philosopher he will need to
remain sceptical of its claims and its truth. He will attempt to
put his 'full conception' into question. His radical commit-
ment to the truth of the subject matter requires that the
starting point and possibilities of his inquiry be investigated.
Accordingly, the philosophical question of what music is, is
avoided if we understand it as an invitation to look at some-
thing we believe to be music in order to gain a description or
definition. The question is posed when the conditions and
assumptions of such an invitation are faced.
The philosophical question of what music is, is not the
same as the question what counts as music. The latter is based
on a number of assumptions and involves, to be sure, a
decision. What counts as music is not a philosophical
question. It is a musicological or culture-historical one which
applies an understanding. The philosophical question asks
about the understanding which is applied itself. It puts the
account of music into question. The decision 'to count'
something as music presupposes an account of music, even
though the latter remains unarticulated. Scruton suggests that
such an account could be derived from looking at the
'central instances of the art'. However, in relation to which
gravitational centre are certain instances 'central' to the art?
Why and in which sense do we refer to it as an 'art'?
Scruton approaches music as a topic of aesthetic theory in
a way that has been the academic custom since the foundat-
ion of the subject of aesthetics by Baumgarten. The decision
to follow in the footsteps of academic tradition has a number
of consequences: speaking about music, Scruton speaks
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about the 'musical work'. The musical work is an
'intentional object' with qualities and characteristics,
structures and features which can account for its meaning.
Any performance (composition, hearing) which makes the
work audible is seen to be fundamentally separate and
additional to the work (pAD5). Music consists of works and
their performances. Is this likely to lead to an account of
music?
Already when it comes to the question of improvisation in
music, the naive division between performance and work
becomes problematic. Scruton's own characterisation of
improvisation makes this clear. In the case of improvisation
the 'work consist[s] in what the performer does. The
performance rules the work, even if it is recorded or written
down' (p.llI). Why should the performance of a work, of a
'central instance' of the art, be significantly distinct from an
improvisation in this respect?2 It hardly appears to be so if we
consider two points. Firstly, performance in the essential
sense (presentation through inner hearing or sounding
realisation of any kind) is necessary to recognise any aspect
of the supposed work in an authentic way. In Scruton's own
academic terminology one could say: music requires 'first
person' acquaintance (listening) in order to be present as
music in the first place. Without performance, music remains
silent. However, what remains of a 'work' if it relies
constitutively on performance?
Secondly, a performance has potentially infinite possibil-
ities to concretely define or transform the characteristics of a
supposed work, even in instances where works are supposedly
written down in scores. Until all possibilities of performance
and interpretation are explored the work remains undefined.
Naturally, this can never be the case. The question of whether
a performance rules the work or the work the performance
(see Scruton's characterisation above) is misplaced until what
both are in themselves is clarified. Performance appears
constitutive of the work. If performance and work are thus
intimately linked, the work can no longer be understood as
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an autonomous 'object'. How, then, can we refer to a work of
music?
A possible answer to this question is that we refer to a
musical work because music is 'at work'. The 'working'
(energeia) of music remains if the performance and musical
work (ergon) are separated conceptually. What exactly this
'working' is and, more importantly, which question may give
us access to its understanding will require further analysis.
The division between work and performance becomes even
more questionable when we contrast Scruton's identification
of the work as the 'intentional object' of music with some of
his descriptions of music. For Scruton, 'music ... exists only
as heard' (p.45I); music, like dance, is 'a way of "being
together" which achieves the absorption in the present
experience and the saturation of interest' (p.357); music is a
reflection of human life (p.500). One of the fundamental
characteristics of music appears to be its 'process' character,
transcending the traditional metaphysical subject-object
division through its immersion in transitory temporality. The
musical flux is a process of essentially unique unfolding.
Music is not ready-to-hand and defined beforehand. It only
comes into being with every instance of music. It does not
follow rules nor is it clear how its aspects of material
objectivity (tones, melody, score, and so on) ultimately relate
to music itself. Music is essentially (as Hans Keller notes)
characterised by unpredictability.3 How does such a charact-
erisation of music as process comply with the supposed
substantiality and thus fixedness implied by the objectivity of
the work?4
It seems that the work of music and its presumed
(intentional) objectivity are not readily understandable
phenomena. Some authors have argued that the musical work
is not ontologically absolute and is in fact a 'regulative
concept' which has emerged in the history of a particular
musical practice:5 Scruton takes issue with such explanations,
asserting that historical explanations of practice do not solve
the questions of philosophy (p.98). In this he appears to be
right: while ontological claims may need to conform to
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historically observed phenomena and practice, philosophical
questioning does not remain content with historic description
of practice and cannot expect the latter to give satisfactory
answers to its questions. Philosophy ultimately asks about the
ontological foundations and presuppositions of practice and
historical understanding. In this regard, an historical analysis
and description is preliminary to exposing the phenomena
which are to give rise to philosophical questions.
Nevertheless, the work of music becomes questionable in
the context of the fact that music, for its existence, requires a
process of making. Music is not simply present as a
collection of intentional objects, of works or performances.
Music occurs in the performance of making and listening
when undertaken in a particular, that is, musical way. Without
such listening and making, music is simply not present. Does
Scruton's assigning a 'tertiary objectivity' to music - 'The
mystery of musical meaning lies partly in this: that it is a
tertiary quality of a tertiary object' (p.16I) - presuppose the
autonomous ontological presence of music in the realm of
intentionality? If it does, what constitutes this presence? If
not, how do we maintain the objectivity of the object here?
If we conflate music with the current cultural practices of
so-called 'high art', the experience of going to concerts and
listening to certain 'works' which are said to exist independ-
ently of their perforrnative realisations seems indeed to imply
that 'intentional objects' exist autonomously within the
intentional realm. However, it is not at all clear that this
experience, considered in itself, is an actual experience of
music as music. Music, regardless of cultural practice, is
subject to temporal characteristics (as event) which appear
first and foremost to elude any kind of objectification. From
this point of view, the musical work and cultural object is
primarily 'at work', a happening. What does this 'at-work-
ness' entail in more concrete detail? Does the absence of
'objectivity' imply that music is subjective, then, that it is
entirely historical or a product of trend and fashion (style)?
What is the relation of making music to its thing-like
products and substances? Is music mere play in which man is
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the measure or does it demand meaningful. serious
participation because it aims at some Good?
The question of musical meaning
The above questions have resulted from an inquiry into the
musical work and its relationship to. and presence within.
performance (making and listening). This investigation now
renders questionable any account of musical understanding
in terms of musical reception. Crudely put. the traditional
position is this: the musical work exists and is perceived
(more or less adequately), presented or performed (more or
less adequately). Its meaning is established through a
meaning-giving substance. structure. and so on. If the
presupposition of the existence of the musical work has
become questionable. the assumption that meaning is
recognised in the work can no longer be sustained without
further questions. What, then. is the meaning of music? How
(where) is meaning achieved?
Scruton dedicates a substantial part of his investigation to
the question of musical meaning and its various aspects
(expression, representation. tonality, and so on). As we have
seen, he believes that meaning is a tertiary quality of a tertiary
object. However. he considers this question originally from a
perceived distinction between sound and tone. According to
Scruton
music begins when people listen to sounds that they are
making, and so discover tones. Of all musical experiences, there
is none more direct than free improvisation (whether vocal or
instrumental): and this should be understood as a paradigm of
listening - the form of listening from which music began.
(p.217)
Two issues appear to be important. The first is the fundam-
ental distinction between sound and tone. The second is that
the specific meaning of music is achieved within the context
of the activity of listening. The activity of listening is para-
digmatically understood as improvisation. What are the
implications of Scruton's characterisations?
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With the distinction between sound and tone, Scruton
wishes to explain two distinct experiences: the purely acoustic
experience of hearing sounds - any kind of sound, including
those belonging to language and noise - and the experience
of hearing musically meaningful entities (Gestalten, phrases,
melodies, movements, works). The transformation of sound
into tone is associated with the activity of meaningful
listening:
A tone is a sound which exists within a musical 'field of force'.
This field of force is something that we hear, when hearing
tones.... It may even be that the transformation from sound to
tone is effected within the act of hearing, and has no independent
reality. But it is a transformation that can be described, just as
soon as we forget the attempt to 'find something in common'
to all the works that critics have described as music. (p.l?)
It is important to note that the transformation of sound into
tone is not attributed to any property of sound itself. It is the
entry of this sound into a field of 'meaning' that provides
such a transformation. Becoming part of a musical organis-
ation of some kind, the sound ceases to be mere sound and
becomes tone. The order constituting this field of meaning is
an intentional one. It is an 'order of action' in which one
tone 'creates the conditions which make the successor a right
or appropriate response to it'.
The identification of 'action' as a modality of musical
order is noteworthy. It can reveal a number of additional and
closely related observations. As 'active' music never repeats
itself. Even where a supposed work is repeatedly performed,
the fundamentally active nature of musical order excludes the
possibility to present anything but a unique process to us.
Strictly speaking, it does not allow any fixity and determin-
able objectification. Action fixed as a repeatable act has
become devoid of 'life' and its active principle. It ceases to
be action. Action is only as long as it is at work. Already the
identification of action in its particularity, the substantive
identification of this action, fails to reach the actual character-
istics of action. An authentic description or grasp of action
would need to show, evoke, or induce a sense or experience
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of this action. But even then such an experience can naturally
only be indirect. The essentially transitory and unique char-
acter of a particular action eludes the grasp and condensation
within the analysis of consciousness.
What are the implications of these reflections? The
reference to the order of action does not only restate the
question of the musical work and its ambiguous temporality.
It also indicates that any supposed meaningful features of
music ('structural' or otherwise) will need to be considered
in regard to its activity and not primarily in regard to its
properties or qualities. When considering the question of
musical meaning further below, we will not only need to
remember that objectifiable qualities of an act say nothing
about the concrete order of action, but that the two answer a
different question: the former becomes the subject of a
substantive inquiry ('what-ness'); the latter is a question of
modali ty (' how-ness').
In relation to the second aspect, it seems quite clear why
Scruton identifies 'free improvisation' as, the paradigm of
listening. A free improvisation is essentially a unique event.
Like the performance of music, listening constitutes an
involvement and participation with that which did not exist
and will not endure. The improvisation itself - as improvisat-
ion - is not repeatable or re-creatable. Its singularity implies
an essential inability to fully reconstruct it in description or
analysis. The essential character - the suspense towards a yet
to be realised and unpredictable future; the transitory
creation and leaving behind of a musical trace in both
material sense and spiritual experience - elude comprehens-
ive description. Listening is essentially a process in which
expectations of substance and definition are both fulfilled
and disappointed. It occurs in flux. Any resulting perceptions
are already a denial of this transitoriness. Listening appears to
require a sustained performance in which the outcome is,
within the context of certain expectations, undetermined.
Faced then with the fact that music is not a 'given' and is
subject to a particular temporality, how then is any under-
standing of it possible? Does understanding not require in the
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very least a potentially finite and definable content to allow
intersubjective referencing? Scruton approaches these quest-
ions again with reference to the intentional character of the
musical object:
What we understand, in understanding music, is not the material
world, but the intentional object: the organisation that can be
heard in the experience. In listening to music, we are attending
to an appearance, not for the sake of information, but for its
own sake. I have no other reason for attending to the music,
than the fact that it sounds as it does. (p.221)
The understanding of music occurs through 'the apt organis-
ation of the musical Gestalt - the organisation which makes it
live for us and which causes us to perceive tones moving in
musical space, rather than mere sequences of sound' (p.229).
It is the perception of tone which provides 'the foundation
for all higher musical experiences, including those of themat-
ic structure, development and form' (p.230).
There appear to be two levels of understanding here: the
understanding which always already knows and hears the
transformation of sound into tone, and the understanding
which eventually more or less competently wishes to under-
stand the 'higher musical experiences'. Scruton is ultimately
interested in the understanding of 'higher musical exper-
iences' - that is, musical works and organisation. While this
interest receives much attention, the starting point - the
presupposed understanding of the sound/tone transformation
- is not illuminated and itself put into question. However, it is
this starting point which gives rise to philosophically import-
ant questions. Is the meaning of music responsible for the
sound/tone transformation or is the sound/tone transform-
ation responsible for the meaning of music? If we take the
case of musical works, is the work understood as an aesthetic
object because it is characterised by transformations of sound
into tone or does the transformation of sound into tone occur
because of the presence of a musical work? What is the
supposed 'field of force' which effects the transformation of
sound into tone?
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One could argue that Scruton attempts to reach this level
of the question by referring to the autonomy of the
intentional level in musical understanding. Although the
concepts which describe the intentional order are themselves
not 'part of the normal "description under which" music is
heard' - they refer beyond the intentional realm - the
process to which they refer is clarified indirectly by their use.
They 'do not merely record our intentional understanding,
but also amplify it, by showing exactly what we hear when we
hear a melody return to its starting point, or a sequence of
dissonant harmonies resolve' (p.233). This seems to explain
that we can, albeit indirectly, reach the level at which the
concepts of musical understanding of aesthetic objects are
formed.
However, the explanation is not satisfactory. Again, the
issue appears to involve the assumption that listening to music
is receptive and that music is a given object. The question
must immediately be how this object gives itself and what
constitutes its objectivity. One may argue that Scruton gives
an answer to this in his account of the metaphorical
dimension of music. The metaphorical experience of music -
the suspension of the two aspects of the intentional object
which is achieved in the exercise of the imagination - can
reveal something about the intentional object. Its peculiar
'double intentionality' which takes 'sound as its object, and
also something that is not and cannot be sound - the life and
movement that is music' accounts for 'what we hear when we
hear sounds as music' (p.96). However, this is ultimately not
an answer to the question of the objectivity of the object
itself. It presupposes it. The question is not which secondary
or tertiary qualities attach to which secondary or tertiary
object, the question is why - on what grounds - the second-
ary or tertiary object or quality is identified as an object or
quality.
The crucial question in relation to Scruton's analysis is his
reliance on investigating music and musical meaning through
an investigation of 'substance' ('Our world is a world of
substances - things, organisms, and people; events and proc-
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esses are what happens to those substances' [p.IO)). This
investigation is the result of the interpretation of the question
of what music is in traditional metaphysical terms. (Not
surprisingly, philosophers who have emphasised the import-
ance of music most have also been most critical of 'subst-
ance' metaphysics, like Nietzsche, Heraclitus, Heidegger, and
to a certain extent Schopenhauer.) As has been shown, music
understood as 'action' and as determined by the ontology of
listening makes these terms questionable. Some of Scruton's
own characterisation of music as 'dance' indicates this (pp.
354-7). It appears that the question of what we hear and
understand, and the corresponding theories that explain this
'what', need to be further investigated by referring to the
fundamental characteristics of the making and hearing of
music. This would transform the question of what music is
into the question of how music occurs.
The question of tonality
The fact that the substantial question appears to transform
itself into the modal question of music appears remarkable to
me. It is common to ignore this transformation and to
conflate the question of what music is with the question of
how it occurs. The fact that the question of the substantiality
of music leads with some necessity to the question of its
modality may give us some insight into music.
Despite Scruton's failure to see the relevance of this
transformation, he nevertheless spends a large part of the
analysis on the question of how music works - that is, how
the meaning of music appears to be achieved. The results of
this investigation are bound to be the most controversial
aspects of his inquiry. In essence, critics will particularly take
aim at Scruton's view of tonality as the 'force of nature' in
music. His discussion of serial and atonal music comes to the
following result:
The possibility remains that tonal music is the only music that
will ever really mean anything to us, and that, if atonal music
sometimes gains a hearing, it is because we can elicit within it
a latent tonal order (p.308)
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The criterion of meaning given here - the transformation
from sound into tone - is Scruton's own. Scruton argues that
neither atonal nor serial music achieve this transformation
autonomously or compellingly. In the case of atonal music,
we are left with the search for tonal associations to provide a
sense of meaning. In serial music, we are unable to hear the
movement of the music as a result of the serial ordering
(p.304).
In addition to the discussion of tonality as a framework for
musical meaning, Scruton discusses some associated culture-
critical questions which may well shed further light on the
question of musical meaning. The transition from tonal to
atonal and serial music in the history of music is accomp-
anied by a number of political, culture-critical, and ideolog-
ical controversies which are claiming the phenomenon of
music for their ideological purpose. Scruton consequently
takes aim at Adorno and the postmodernists who have
claimed the demise of tonal order to be symbolic of
revolutions in world view and ideology. Adorno's point that
the new music of Schoenberg purifies and emancipates the
individual in a 'fetishised', bourgeois culture is refuted by
the view that the revolution itself has become a 'fetish'.
According to Scruton, however, the social reality is that avant-
garde music is supported, not by emancipated masses, but by
an elite of concert-going, bourgeois intellectuals. The masses
take to popular, aesthetically inferior music full of cliches
and formulas. Its success has 'less to do with the triumph of
capitalism than with the triumph of democracy' (p.470). The
even more radical challenge presented by the postmodern
classification of tonality as a 'style' is addressed by Scruton
as follows: hearing as we hear, we need to do justice to the
absolute role of tonality as a 'force of nature'; tonality is not
a style, it is the basis for musical style.
The postmodern interpretation for Scruton points ultimate-
ly to a moral dilemma, the dilemma of nihilism. Music as art
involves some affirmation. however qualified. of the actual. The
faint sarcastic smile of the postmodemist is as incompatible
with greatness as is the helpless nostalgia of a Havergal Brian
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or the sentimental sweetness of a Rodrigo. Postmodem irony is
simply a more sophisticated way of avoiding the question of
modem life - the question of what we are to affirm in it. and
what deny. If art ceases to affirm life. then it loses its point:
after all. life is all that we have. (p.493)
There are two interesting points in this comment: firstly. one
cannot help suspecting that Scruton' s moral and cultural
pessimism is responsible for formulating his criterion of the
meaning of music. 6 To be sure. this appears initially
otherwise. It seems that the question of tonality is approached
via the question of musical meaning and on the basis of the
definition that music involves the transformation of sound
into tone. However. Scruton's critique of postmodem culture
(which may well contain much accurate analysis and
description) and his discussion of the question of tonality as a
moral question suggest that, in truth, the argument is not a
search for, but a defence of, the meaning of music. The
musical masterworks of the past, which are understood and
appreciated. form the empirical basis for a criterion of
meaning to which music of other times and kinds does not
(or no longer) conform.
Secondly, the insistence on affirmation in music, if taken
as a defining criterion, restates the need to recognise that
music demands an active, participative engagement with it.
Accordingly, an aesthetic theory which relies on work-
receptive assumptions about music will be troubled by serious
questions and quite possibly fail to reach a philosophical
dimension at all. The question of to what extent tonality is
responsible for musical meaning is not a question about the
given. It is a question about how music is made and heard
(essentially a unified process) and how it is in this making
and hearing discovered. To listen to music is to be invited to
participate in its discovery. This invitation may be of a
different kind - different, yet equally compelling and mean-
ingful if music is discovered - whether it is issued by
Beethoven, Schoenberg. or Boulez. The tricky question of
meaning resurfaces when the suspicion arises that no
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meaningful invitation is issued, or when the invitation cannot
be followed because the message appears incomprehensible.
For the musician the question of meaning is not necess-
arily puzzling. Living within the confines of an art - a techne
- the musician lives within and works on a horizon of
meaningful practice which is defined through the past and
expanded towards the future. The unpredictable invitations
which music offers will always present challenges to his
hearing and making. Whether or not an invitation is followed
is dependent on understanding the invitation as a challenge.
Listening and making evolve in dialogue with makers and
listeners. An invitation that seemed outrageous, meaningless,
and abysmal becomes accepted, meaningful. and finally
familiar through this dialogue of making and listening. The
movement and meaning made, heard, and discovered as
music is of a manifold, overwhelming kind. Analysis and
articulated understanding pretend to uncover a defined - and
a posteriori predictable - relationship between technical
device and profundity of meaning. Such a relationship
neither exists nor is it pre-given to the making and listening.
It is worked at and achieved in living performance. The
musical meaning rests on 'a clearly implied conflict between
that which you hear and that which is being contradicted by
what you hear,.7
The unpredictable nature of musical movement is familiar
to the musician. To the philosopher it remains a puzzle, albeit
one of utmost significance. The philosopher suspects that
truth may in essence be unpredictable. If his intuition is
correct, truth needs to show itself through itself and may
elude the confident analysis and grasp of the expert. The
philosopher's task is to ensure that the question of music
unfolds in its own, unpredictable way. He needs to remain its
servant and to contemplate, not solve it.
I The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
All subsequent references to Scruton's book will appear in the
body of the article.
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2 G~rard Genette draws attention to the similarities in the practice of
improvisation and performance of pre-existing works. The
former is shown to be a more complex, but not necessarily
categorically distinct (that is, 'purer') state of performance; see
his The Work of Art: Immanence and Transcendence (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1997), p.61.
3 Hans Keller, Essays on Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), p. 123.
4 Scruton's understanding of the musical work as an intentional
object is not new. A well known account of the musical work as
intentional object is advanced by Roman Ingaarden in his The
Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986). Ingaarden's characteris-
ation of the composed musical work as an intentional object, a
'schema ... a determined multiplicity of possibilities desig-
nated by the areas of indeterminacy of the schematic product'
(p. 150) would need to face similar questions.
5 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992).
6 'The postmodern world is not merely democratic; it is irreligious,
since that is what life in the present moment requires ... the
human psyche itself has been thrown out of orbit. as the world
is swallowed by its own representations. The television screen
has ceased to be a summary of distant episodes, and become the
criterion of reality itself. Events are real to the extent that they
can be captured on a videotape and made available in playback.
But when the really real is endlessly repeatable, nothing truly
happens. The river of time ceases to murmur in the psychic
background, and a zombie-like disengagement spreads like a
fungus over the human will. Life becomes episodic, like a soap
opera ... The social world ... becomes sentimentalised' (p.
506). Lydia Goehr argues this point in more detail in her review
of Scruton's book in Journal of the American Musicological
Society 52: 2 (Summer 1999), pp.398- 409.
7 Hans Keller. Essays on Music, pp.121-5.
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